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CASES NOTED
debtor, and the debt due is discharged for less than its face amount, the
courts have held that the reduction is not income.' 8 Such direct dealing would
seem to raise a strong implication that the creditor intended to forgive the
balance of the debt rather than sell it in an "arms-length" transaction. This
view of the facts in the instant case was taken by Mr. Justice Reed and Mr.
Justice Douglas, who dissented ("We held in the American Dental case that
the 'receipt of financial advantages gratuitously' was a gift .... Congress has
made no change in the law since that time ... .").19
It is submitted that the majority, in reaching the result in the instant case
that gain to the taxpayer through direct negotiations with his creditors consti-
tuted taxable income, not only overrules sub silentio the American Dental
case, but in addition further complicates and confuses this already complicated
question.
TAXATION - FEDERAL ESTATE TAX - REVERTER BY OPERATION OF
LAW - EXTENSION OF HALLOCK DOCTRINE
In 1920, the decedent created a trust of certain stock and named himself
and another as trustees. Under the provisions of the trust agreement the trust
income was to be distributed among the decedent's three children so long as
he lived and if they did not survive him, to any of their surviving children.
Upon his death the principal of the trust was to be divided among the same
beneficiaries and in the same manner as the income. The trust agreement was
silent as to what disposition was to be made of the principal of the trust and
any income which might have accumulated thereon in the event the decedent
were to survive all his children and grandchildren. At the decedent's death
in 1940 the Commissioner included the entire value of the trust, together with
the accumulated income in the decedent's gross estate. The Tax Court reversed
the Commissioner but the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
upheld the finding of the Commissioner. The Supreme Court granted certiorari.
Held, that the trust property was properly included in the decedent's gross
estate under Section 811 (c) of the Internal Revenue Code, which section
requires the inclusion in a decedent's gross estate the value at his death of all
property transferred in his lifetime by a trust "intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his death." Spiegel's Estate v. Commis-
sioner of Internal Revenue, 69 Sup. Ct. 301 (1949) (6-3 decision). ,
This case is another in a series of cases extending the doctrine established
18. See I lirsch v. Conn'r, 115 F.2d 656 (C.C.A. 7th 1940) ; Hotel Astoria, Inc., 42
B. T. A. 759 (1940) ; lelvering v. American Dental Co., 318 U.S. 322 (1943).
19. 69 Sup. Ct. 358, 370 (1949). Even Mr. Justice Rutledge, who concurred with the
majority, thought ". . . that the result is essentially in conflict with that reached in Hel-
vering v. American Dental Co. . . ." Ibid.
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in Helvering v1. Hallock 1 and supplemental decisions interpreting Section
811 (c). The settlor in the Hallock case expressly retained a contingent rever-
sionary interest 2 effective if he survived the beneficiary ; subsequently, the
ultimate possession, or right to possession was held in suspense until his death.
The trust corpus was held includible II the decedent's gross estate as the
subject of a transfer "intended to take effect in possession or enjoyment at or
after his death." The Fideliti'-Philadelphia Trust Co. v'. Rotheusics? Comn mis-
sioner v. Estate of Field,4 and Go/dstone v. United States I decisions further
extended the doctrine of the Hallock case to include any inter-vivos transfer of
property where the settlor expressly retains a reversionary interest. The "pro-
pinquity or certainty" of the interest retained was considered immaterial as long
as the decedent retained this contingent interest in the property until his
"death or thereafter," delaying until then the ripening of the full dominion over
the property. Many of the lower federal courts concluded from these decisions
that remoteness or uncertainty of the reversionary interest was not essential,
holding that if the corpus of the trtist does not shed the possibility of reverter
until at or after the decedent's death, the value of the entire corpus on the
date of death is taxable.6
In the present case the Court has taken the opportunity to extend the
Hallock doctrine to a case where the settlor made a complete and irrevocable
transfer of property wherein no express provision was contained whereby
the property might revert to the settlor. The corpus and accmulated income
were nevertheless held includible in the decedent's gross estate because the
majority decided that the disposition of the property was incomplete. The
Commissioner maintained that in the event the beneficiaries predeceased the
settlor, the trust would fail and the property under the descent law of the
state would revert to the grantor. In sustaining this contention tile majority
held that this remote possibility of reverter by "operation of law" was sufficient
to draw the trust corpus within the purview of the statute.
The fundamental problem involved in the present and related Ha/lock
1. 309 L. S. 106 (1939).
2. The term "reverter" is not used in any strict property sense. It indicate, that
property transferred inter-vivos may return to the grantor or his estate. See 1 PA m,
FDFAm. ESTATE AND GiFT TAXATION § 7,21 n.1 (1942).
3. 324 U S. 108 (1945).
4. 324 0. S. 113 (1945).
5. 325 U. S. 687 (1945).
6. E.g., Commissioner v. Bayne's Estate, 155 F.2d 475 (C. C. A. 2d 1946) ; Thomas
v. Graham, 158 F.2d 561 (C.C.A. 5th 1946) ; Commissioner v. Bank of California, 155 F.2d
I (C. C. .9th 1946). Contra: Commissioner v Hall's Estate, 153 F.2d 172 (C. C. A. 2d)
1946) ; Lloyd's Estate v. Commissioner, 141 F.2d 758 (C. C, A. 2d 1944) : Helvering v.
Proctor, 140 F.2d 87 (C. C. A. 2d 1944) ; Commissioner v. Cornelia V. W. Kellogg. 119
F.2d 87 (C. C. A. 2d 1941 ) ; Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 58 1F.
Supp. 565 (Ct. Cf. 1945) ; The Fifth Avenue Bank of New York v. Nunam, 59 F. Supp.
753 (E. D. N. Y. 1945) ; Emma I., Keek, 10'T. C. 1121 (1948) ; Benjamin L. Allen, 3
T. C. 844 (1944) ; Frances Biddle Trust, 3 T. C. 832 (1944) ; Joseph K. Cass. 3 T. C. 562
(1944) ; Henry S. Downe, 2 T. C. 967 (1943) ; Mabel H. Houghton, 2 T. C. 871 (1943) ;
Ellen Portia Conger Goodyear, 2 1'. C. 885 (1943) ; Charles Delany, 1 T. C. 781 (1943).
CASES NOTED
cases is the interpretation of Section 811 (c). The two component elements of
this provision are, according to a leading writer: "(1 ) the decedent must have
made a transfer, and (2) the transfer must have been intended to take effect in
possession or enjoyment at or after his demise. "' 7 (Italics ours) In the instant
case it would appear that the majority completely ignored the latter provision
and based its conclusion objectively on what was created by the trust instru-
went rather than on what was intended as evidenced by extrinsic circumstances.
It has often been held that the element of intention is essential in interpreting
the federal estate tax and that this element cannot be discarded.' The purpose
of the statute was to reach substitutes for testamentary dispositions.9 In United
States v. Wells the Court maintained that while an irrevocable transfer may
have all the characteristics of a valid inter-vivos gift, the "differentiating factor
must be found in the transferor's motive." 10 Mr. Justice Frankfurter, inter-
preting the sane provision in the Hallock case, indicated that emphasis should
be placed on "substance rather than form." Judge Opper concurred with this
opinion in the Biddle case,1 ' contending that the crucial question is whether or
not a transfer was ". . . primarily intended to take effect in possession or
enjoyment only at the decedent's death or subsequent to it. .... ,, 12 (Italics
ours.) Taxation is a practical matter, t5 and liability should not be based on the
"niceties of the art of conveyancing" nor on the refined technicalities of the
law of property."
Construing a legal document objectively may be in many instances neces-
sary and even desirable. When an objective test is administered, however,
without considering the settlor's intended consequences, the results in some
instances will be absurd and unrealistic. 1 5 If this condition is to be avoided,
7. Eisenstein, The Hallock Problem: A Case Study in Adriinistration, 58 HARv. L.
REv. 1141, 1149 (1945).
8. See Lloyd's Estate v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 141 F.2d 758, 763 (C. C. A.
3d 1944) ; The Fifth Avenue Bank of New York v. Nunam, 59 F. Supp, 753, 755
(E. D. N. Y. 1945). Contra: Commissioner v. Bayne's Estate, 156 F.2d 475 (C. C. A. 2d
1946) ; cf. Commissioner v. Hall's Estate, 153 F.2d 172 (C. C. A. 2d 1946).
9. Klein v. United States, 283 U. S. 231 (1931).
10, 283 U. S. 102, 116, 117 (1931).
11. Frances Biddle Trust, 3 T. C. 832, 843 (1944). In Central Hanover Bank & Trust
Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 565, 567 (Ct. CI. 1945), Littleton (concurring), stated,
"I think the rule announced in Helvering v. Haltock where a reversionary interest was ex-
plicitly retained, should not be extended by implication and without proof that such was
the intention of the donor."
12, "Although such a rule has its obvious disadvantages, it avoids at least the un-
realistic, mechanical distinction between a reverter by operation of law and a reverter
which is specifically reserved in the instrument of transfer." 1 PAUL, FE.DERAL ESTATE AND
Gir TAXATION 178-79 (1946 Supp.).
13. See Ellen Portia Conger Goodyear v. Commissioner, 2 T. C. 885, 891 (1943).
14. See note 9, supra.
15. "The Government's claims in these cases, which deal generally with reverters by
operation of law, reach far beyond the familiar zones of incidence." 1 PAUL, FIDERAL Es-
'rF AND Git TAXATION 172-73 (1946 Supp.). In Harris Fahnestock, 4 T. C. 1096 (1945)
it was found that the decedent's reversionary interest was worth approximately thirty cents
out of a trust principal of $1,000,000. The Ellen Portia Conger Goodyear, 2 T. C. 885 (1943)
involved four trusts; in order to regain the property in two of the trusts, the grantor had
to survive her son, the latter's children and the children's issue. The actuarial value of the
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the degree of likelihood or remoteness of the contingency coupled with the
intention of the settlor must be given full consideration.18 Otherwise liability
may be incurred by the discovery of a valueless gossamer thread of possession
or enjoyment.17
Under the decision rendered in the instant case tax liability may be
incurred irrespective of the decedent's intention, if he did not divest himself
completely of all remote possibility of regaining the property. It is difficult to
perceive that the decedent intended to make an incomplete gift by studiously
reserving through silent operation of law a remote possibility of regaining
possession of the corpus. The absence of intention is even more apparent if
considered in the light of the status of the local law with respect to the rever-
sionary interest at the time the trust indenture was created.18
The decision in the Spiegel case may meet with considerable criticism
because the majority seemingly ignored the settlor's intent as well as the
statutory language of 811(c). Yet the conclusion reached was merely the
logical culmination of the trend which has prevailed in the Court as presently
constituted.' 9 Perhaps the result of the principal case may be avoided by
naming the United States Government or a charitable organization as the
ultimate remainderman. 2
TAXATION-TRANSFER TO TAKE EFFECT IN
POSSESSION OR ENJOYMENT AFTER DEATH
In 1924, decedent, then twenty-one and unmarried, executed a trust,
naming himself and two brothers as co-trustees. Decedent reserved no power
to alter, amend, or revoke, but the income from the trust was to be paid to him
for life, and on his death the principal was payable to his surviving issue.
reverter at death, in the case of one of these trusts, was $.000000163 out of a corpus of ap-
proximately $395,000 and in the case of the other, $.0000000000876 out of a total value of
$338,000. The return of the property in the third trust hinged upon the prior death of the
grantor's daughter, the latter's issue and the latter distributees in the event of intestacy. The
reverter at death was estimated as $.000046 as compared with a corpus of $362,000. Under
the provisions of the fourth suit, which were similar to those of the third, the reverter was
worth $.0001814 out of a trust principal of over $348,000. In Smith M. Flinkinger, P-H
1943 T.C. Memo. Dec. Serv. 1 43,455 (1943) the actuarial value of reverter at death was
worth twenty-nine cents out of a trust corpus of $444,000.
16. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 58 F. Supp. 565, 566 (Ct.
Cl. 1945). Contra: Thomas v. Graham, 158 F.2d 561, 563 (C. C. A. 5th 1946).
17. See Mr. Justice Frankfurter, dissenting in the present case at 345.
I8. See Mr. Justice Burton, dissenting in the instant case at 310-313, where he questions
the law of Illinois with respect to possibility of reverter. Mr. Justice Frankfurter suggests
that the case be remanded to the state court to secure an adjudication on this issue, possibly
through the procedure of a declaratory judgment. Id. at 348.
19. Helvering v. Hallock, supra; Fidelity-Philadelphia Trust Co. v. Rothensies, supr o;
Commissioner v. Estate of Field, supra; Goldstone v. United States, supra; Commissioner
v. Church's Estate, 69 Sup. Ct. 322 (1949).
20. Note, The New Hallock Regulation, 2 TAx L. Rav. 94, 10 (1946). See Spencer,
The Federal Estate Tax on Inter-Vivos Trusts: A Common Sense Rule for Hallock Cases,
59 HARv. L. REv. 43 (1945).
